a workload policy enforcement tool for Kubernetes
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The k-rail project has been deprecated and will receive no new features or bugfixes except in the case of critical security vulnerabilities. We recommend migrating to an actively developed tool like OPA Gatekeeper that provides similar functionality.
k-rail is a workload policy enforcement tool for Kubernetes. It can help you secure a multi tenant cluster with minimal disruption and maximum velocity.
By default, the Kubernetes APIs allow for a variety of easy privilege escalation routes. When operating a multi-tenant cluster, many features can be dangerous or introduce instability and must be used judiciously. k-rail attempts to make workload policy enforcement easy in Kubernetes, even if you already have a large number of diverse workloads. Several features enable you to roll out policy enforcement safely without breaking existing workloads:
{
"enforced": true,
"kind": "PodExec",
"namespace": "ecommerce",
"policy": "pod_no_exec",
"resource": "payment-processor",
"user": "[email protected]",
"time": "2019-11-03T06:28:07Z"
}
---
- cluster_name: paas-ci-us-west1
resource_name: "*"
namespace: "cluster-conformance-testing"
username: "[email protected]"
group: "*"
exempt_policies:
- "pod_no_privileged_containers"
- "pod_no_bind_mounts"
- "pod_no_host_network"
- "pod_default_seccomp_policy"
- "pod_no_host_pid"
- "pod_no_exec"
$ kubectl apply --namespace default -f examples/non-compliant-ingress.yaml
Error from server (InternalError): error when creating "examples/non-compliant-ingress.yaml":
Internal error occurred: admission webhook "k-rail.cruise-automation.github.com" denied the request:
Ingress bad-ingress had violation: Require Ingress Exemption: Using the 'public' Ingress class requires an exemption
Ingress bad-ingress had violation: Requires Unique Ingress Host: Ingress Host should not point to multiple namespaces
By leveraging the first three features you can quickly and easily roll out enforcement to deployments without breaking them and monitor violations with confidence. The interactive feedback informs and educates engineers during future policy violations.
Cruise was able to utilize this software to apply enforcement to more than a dozen clusters with thousands of existing diverse workloads in all environments in about a week without breaking existing deployments. Now you can too.
If you have a new cluster without existing workloads, just run k-rail in enforcement mode for the policies you desire and add exemptions as needed.
If you have a cluster with existing workloads, run it in monitor mode for a few weeks or until you have collected enough data. The violation events are emmitted in the logs in JSON, so it is suggested that you analyze that data collected to make exemptions as needed. Once the exemptions are applied, you can safely turn on enforcement mode without breaking existing workloads.
You can install or update k-rail using the helm chart in charts/k-rail. You can install the latest chart directly from our repo, by running:
# add the helm repo
helm repo add k-rail https://cruise-automation.github.io/k-rail/
helm repo update
# prepare the namespace
kubectl create namespace k-rail
kubectl label namespace k-rail k-rail/ignore=true
# install
helm install k-rail k-rail/k-rail --namespace k-rail
For the Helm deployment, all configuration for policies and exemptions are contained in charts/k-rail/values.yaml. Feel free to override configuration values as you see fit per the various Helm provided methods.
For Helm 2 and below, it is recommended to use helm template render the YAML for applying rather than using Helm Tiller:
helm template --namespace k-rail charts/k-rail | kubectl apply -f -
By default all policies are enforced (report_only: false).
Test the default configuration by applying the provided non-compliant deployment:
kubectl apply --namespace default -f examples/non-compliant-deployment.yaml
If ussing helm install,
helm uninstall k-rail --namespace k-rail
If using helm template,
helm template --namespace k-rail charts/k-rail | kubectl delete -f -
There are a few ways of viewing violations. Violations from realtime feedback and the Events API is most useful for users, but violations from logs is most useful for presentation and analysis.
You may see violations when applying your resources:
$ kubectl apply -f examples/non-compliant-deployment.yaml
Error from server (k-rail): error when creating "examples/non-compliant-deployment.yaml": admission webhook "k-rail.cruise-automation.github.com" denied the request:
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: Host Bind Mounts: host bind mounts are forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: Docker Sock Mount: mounting the Docker socket is forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: Immutable Image Reference: image tag must include its sha256 digest
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: No Host Network: Using the host network is forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: No Privileged Container: Using privileged containers is forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: No New Capabilities: Adding additional capabilities is forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: No Host PID: Using the host PID namespace is forbidden
Deployment bad-deployment had violation: Safe to evict: annotation is required for Pods that use emptyDir or hostPath mounts to enable cluster autoscaling
You can also see violations that have occurred recently with the events API:
$ kubectl get events --namespace default
LAST SEEN TYPE REASON KIND MESSAGE
3m41s Warning FailedCreate ReplicaSet Error creating: admission webhook "k-rail.cruise-automation.github.com" denied the request:
bad-pod-5f7cd9bf45-rbhsb had violation: Docker Sock Mount: mounting the Docker socket is forbidden
Violations are also emitted as structured data in the logs:
$ kubectl logs --namespace k-rail --selector name=k-rail | jq '.'
{
"enforced": true,
"kind": "Deployment",
"namespace": "default",
"policy": "pod_no_host_network",
"resource": "evil-deployment",
"time": "2019-10-23T19:54:24Z",
"user": "[email protected]"
}
{
"enforced": true,
"kind": "Deployment",
"namespace": "default",
"policy": "pod_no_privileged_container",
"resource": "evil-deployment",
"time": "2019-10-23T19:54:24Z",
"user": "[email protected]"
}
{
"enforced": true,
"kind": "Deployment",
"namespace": "default",
"policy": "pod_no_new_capabilities",
"resource": "evil-deployment",
"time": "2019-10-23T19:54:24Z",
"user": "[email protected]"
}
Since the violations are outputted as structured data, you are encouraged to aggregate and display that information. GCP BigQuery + Data Studio, Sumologic, Elasticsearch + Kibana, Splunk, etc are all capable of this.
Below are the policies built-in to K-Rail. Additional custom written policies can be created and configured for your organization if they are not general purpose enough for committing to upstream. See the example plugin provided for details on writing your own policy plugin.
shareProcessNamespace: true is a Pod Spec directive that puts all containers in a Pod within
the same PID Namespace. When this occurs, containers can, for example, access each others' filesystem and memory,
as long as they share user and group IDs. These effects could be unexpected, especially if security (e.g. egress controls)
occurs in a sidecar container.
The No Exec policy prevents users from execing into running pods unless they have an exemption. This policy is typically enforced within a production environment, but run in report-only mode in dev and staging environments to facilitate debugging.
Execing into a pod can enable someone to do many nefarious things to that workload. Eventually this policy will also apply a taint label to the Pod to indicate that it should no longer be trusted and can be evicted.
Host bind mounts (also called hostPath mounts) can be used to exfiltrate data from or escalate privileges on the host system. Using host bind mounts can cause unreliability of the node if it causes a partition to fill up.
The Docker socket bind mount provides API access to the host Docker daemon, which can be used for privilege escalation or otherwise control the container host. Using Docker sock mounts can cause unreliability of the node because of the extra workloads that the Kubernetes schedulers are not aware of.
Note: It is recommended to use the No Bind Mounts policy to disable all hostPath mounts rather than only this policy, because it is easily bypassed. This policy does not provide meaningful protection and is here for informative purposes.
Running as the root user is extremely dangerous and should be forbidden for all possible workloads.
This policy blocks pods when the security context doesn't explicitly set runAsUser: [some uid > 0] or runAsNonRoot: true
The securityContext can be set at the pod level or on each individual container.
By default, an emptyDir lacks a sizeLimit parameter, and is disk-based;
a Pod with access to said emptyDir can consume the Node's entire disk (i.e. the limit is unbounded) until the offending Pod is deleted or evicted, which can constitute a denial-of-service condition at the affected Node (i.e. DiskPressure).
This policy
emptyDir volumepolicy_config:
mutate_empty_dir_size_limit:
maximum_size_limit: "1Gi"
default_size_limit: "512Mi"
Sets a default seccomp profile (runtime/default or a configured one) for Pods if they have no existing seccomp configuration. The default seccomp policy for Docker and Containerd both block over 40 syscalls, many of which are potentially dangerous. The default policies are usually very compatible with applications, too.
The Mutate Default Seccomp Profile policy can be configured in the k-rail configuration file.
Example
policy_config:
policy_default_seccomp_policy: "runtime/default"
Docker image tags in a registry are mutable, so if you reference a tag without specifying the image digest someone or something could change the image you were using without you knowing.
You can obtain the immutable reference for an image with this command:
$ docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' alpine:3.8
alpine@sha256:dad671370a148e9d9573e3e10a9f8cc26ce937bea78f3da80b570c2442364406
You can also add the tag back in for it to be more human readable:
alpine:3.8@sha256:dad671370a148e9d9573e3e10a9f8cc26ce937bea78f3da80b570c2442364406
Host networking enables packet capture of host network interfaces and a bypass to some cloud meta data APIs, such as the GKE metadata API. The metadata API can be used to escalate access.
The host PID namespace can be used to inspect process environment variables (which often contain secrets). It can also potentially be used to dump process memory, modify kernel parameters, and insert kprobes+uprobes into the kernel to exfiltrate information.
Kernel Capabilities can be used to escalate to level of kernel API access available to the process. Some can enable loading kernel modules, changing namespace, load eBPF byte code in the kernel and other potentially dangerous things.
Privileged containers have all capabilities and also removes cgroup resource accounting.
Helm Tiller installations often have an unauthenticated API open to the cluster which provides a privilege escalation route to ClusterAdmin or NamespaceEditor.
Note: This policy only blocks images that /tiller in their name from being deployed. It is not a robust policy and serves more as a reminder for engineers to seek an alternate route of deployment, such as using helm template or isopod.
There are many malicious, poorly configured, and outdated and vulnerable images available in public Docker image repositories. Images must be sourced from configured trusted internal repositories or from an official Docker Hub repository.
The Trusted Image Repository policy can be configured in the k-rail configuration file.
Example
policy_config:
policy_trusted_repository_regexes:
- '^gcr.io/some-gcr-repo/.*' # private GCR repo
- '^k8s.gcr.io/.*' # official k8s GCR repo
- '^[A-Za-z0-9\-:@]+$' # official docker hub images
DEPRECATED - See Mutate Safe to Evict below
The Kubernetes autoscaler will not evict pods using hostPath or emptyDir mounts unless they have this annotation:
cluster-autoscaler.kubernetes.io/safe-to-evict=true
This policy validates that Pods have this annotation. You'll probably find the mutation policy below more useful.
The Kubernetes autoscaler will not evict pods using hostPath or emptyDir mounts unless they have this annotation:
cluster-autoscaler.kubernetes.io/safe-to-evict=true
This policy mutates Pods that do not have the annotation specfied to be true. It will not override existing annotations with false.
You can also set the annoation on existing Pods with this one-liner:
$ kubectl get po --all-namespaces -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.spec.volumes[].hostPath or .spec.volumes[].emptyDir) | [ .metadata.namespace, .metadata.name ] | @tsv' | while IFS=$'\t' read -r namespace pod; do echo "\n NAMESPACE: $namespace \n POD: $pod \n"; kubectl annotate pod -n $namespace $pod "cluster-autoscaler.kubernetes.io/safe-to-evict=true"; done
There are cerntain images which require the enforcement of the ImagePullPolicy according to different user scenarios
The Mutate Image Pull Policy can be configured in the k-rail configuration file.
Example
policy_config:
mutate_image_pull_policy:
IfNotPresent:
- '^gcr.io/repo/image1.*'
- '^gcr.io/repo/image2.*'
Always:
- '^gcr.io/private-repo/secretimage.*'
The Require Ingress Exemption policy requires the configured ingress classes to have an a Policy exemption to be used. This is typically useful if you want to gate the usage of public ingress.
The Require Ingress Exemption policy can be configured in the k-rail configuration file.
Example
policy_config:
policy_require_ingress_exemption_classes:
- nginx-public
Unique Ingress Host policy requires the configured ingress hosts to be unique across cluster namespaces. This is helps to prevent ingress host collisions.
Annotations used on services are used to configure public IPs or other cloud provider specific parameters.
This policy validates the annotations put on a service and will reject services defined with annotations outside the acceptable range.
Each annotation to police is configured with a list of possible values and a parameter allow_missing which defines if a service is allowed without this annotation present.
policy_config:
policy_require_service_loadbalancer_annotations:
- annotations:
- "cloud.google.com/load-balancer-type"
- "networking.gke.io/load-balancer-type"
allowed_values:
- internal
- external
allow_missing: false
- annotation: "networking.gke.io/internal-load-balancer-allow-global-access"
allowed_values:
- true
allow_missing: false
Gateways set on Istio virtual services are used to configure public and private Istio ingress access along with potentially usage of sensitive domains.
This policy validates the gateways listed on an Istio virtual service and will reject virtual services defined with gateways outside the acceptable range.
A list of allowed gateways is configured along with a parameter to set if an empty list of gateways is allowed for virtual services. According to the Istio virtual service documentation, an unset list of gateways will default to the mesh gateway which will apply the virtual service to all sidecars in the service mesh.
policy_config:
policy_require_virtualservice_gateways:
allowed_gateways:
- "istio-system/internal-gateway"
- "mesh"
allow_empty_gateways: true
Enforcing the policy prevents direct access to potentially sensitive files or directories at the Node-level via Persistent Volumes. Production clusters should not use HostPath. Instead a cluster administrator would provision a network resource like a Google Compute Engine persistent disk, an NFS share, or an Amazon Elastic Block Store volume.
Enforcing the policy prevents the creation of cluster level role bindings that authorize unathenticated or anonymous users to access resources.
Enforcing the policy prevents the creation of namespace level role bindings that authorize unathenticated or anonymous users to access resources.
Prevent misconfigured pod disruption budgets from disrupting normal system maintenance such as node drains. Ensures that
Prevents providing External IPs on a Service to mitigate CVE-2020-8554.
Prevents users from specifing an unconfined apparmor policy which can be used with other conditions to lead to container escape.
When a Custom Resource Definition is deleted the corresponding Custom Resources are deleted as well. This creates the risk of accidentally destroying important data during regular maintenance. This policy allows the user to set the annotation k-rail.crd.protect: enabled on any CRD which will prevent its deletion if any children CRs exist.
In response to NGINX Ingress Controller vulnerability CVE-2021-25742, this rule will disallow usages of all NGINX snippet annotations.
For the Helm deployment, all configuration is contained in [charts/k-rail/values.yaml](cha
Content type
Image
Digest
sha256:93eb586ff…
Size
19.1 MB
Last updated
over 3 years ago
docker pull cruise/k-rail