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readystack/multuscni

By readystack

•Updated 4 days ago

Multus CNI: several network interfaces for a Kubernetes pod. Signed; SBOM and SLSA v1 provenance.

Image
Networking
0

732

readystack/multuscni repository overview

⁠Multus CNI

Signed: cosign SBOM: SPDX attached Provenance: SLSA v1

readystack/multuscni:v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1

Source, recipe and records

A cosign-signed build of https://github.com/k8snetworkplumbingwg/multus-cni⁠ (Apache-2.0), tag v4.3.1, commit d61706810cc8be60381dcb66e6a2428d5eb2795a, built clean-room from official upstream source by ReadyStack⁠.

⁠Who uses it and why

Who: Kubernetes operators whose pods need more than one network interface, for example to reach a separate storage or management network.

Why: Multus CNI lets a pod have several network interfaces. It acts as a meta-plugin, calling other CNI plugins to attach extra networks alongside the cluster's default pod network.

Use case: A team runs workloads that must also sit on a separate VLAN. With Multus, each pod keeps its normal interface on the cluster network and gets an additional interface on the VLAN, described in a network attachment definition and created by another CNI plugin.

About the upstream project, written from its own description: https://github.com/k8snetworkplumbingwg/multus-cni⁠

⁠What you get

Signature, user and attestations below were measured on the published digest sha256:ab4bb5e3899e4a524a3f9d3ded2cc74c54ef6f36f8fc93fa5e89cf3cfab27fc3 on 2026-10-29.

  • Scan scores — we scan every image we publish every day (an SBOM made with syft, vulnerabilities matched with grype, scored with cerodeo-v1, the rubric ce.rodeo published until 2026-10-26) and record each scan with how its score was derived. This release's first and latest scan: https://readystack.dev/products/multuscni⁠
  • ReadyStack release check — passed at release on 2026-10-29: no fixable critical or high vulnerability (Docker Scout and OSV), a non-root user, SBOM and provenance attached. This is ReadyStack's own test, not a Docker grade; vulnerabilities published since then are in today's result at https://readystack.dev/queue⁠.
  • Signed — cosign signature by the ReadyStack release key (fingerprint 04daa92344a52dbc) on this release's index digest sha256:ab4bb5e3899e4a524a3f9d3ded2cc74c54ef6f36f8fc93fa5e89cf3cfab27fc3; verify with cosign verify --key https://readystack.dev/keys/cosign.pub readystack/multuscni:v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1.
  • Attestations — An SPDX SBOM and SLSA v1 build provenance are attached to this digest.
  • Runs as a non-root user (multuscni).
  • Built from source by ReadyStack.

⁠Which tag should I pull?

This image follows the ReadyStack release-tag convention:

  • The current release is v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1 — the release listed at readystack.dev. Release tags use the pattern <upstream-version>-CE-<base-os>-r<N>; the current one is signed, attested (SBOM + provenance), and is provided under the ReadyStack Agreement⁠.

  • Earlier release tags (an older version or revision in the same pattern) are superseded. They stay pullable so existing deployments can pin them, but they are no longer re-graded, and fixes appear only in newer releases: move to the current release. For a superseded release's build kit, ask support.

  • Release tags never move, so pulling the same tag again never changes the image. To be offered each new release automatically (a new revision r<N+1>, or a new upstream version), use the ReadyStack Renovate preset: https://readystack.dev/updates.html⁠

  • Any tag beginning with internal- is an engineering-pipeline artifact published for build observability. It is unsupported, may change or disappear without notice, and must not be used in production.

# ✓ current release
docker pull readystack/multuscni:v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1

# ✗ unsupported (do not pull)
docker pull readystack/multuscni:internal-...

This release is signed; verify it with cosign verify --key https://readystack.dev/keys/cosign.pub readystack/multuscni:v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1 (the signature is recorded in the public Sigstore transparency log). Support: [email protected]⁠, as set out in the ReadyStack Agreement⁠.

⁠Deployment

The kube-multus DaemonSet (product-kits/kubevirt-stack/install/network/multus-daemonset.yml, upstream's deployments/multus-daemonset.yml with our image): init container /install_multus --type thin, then /thin_entrypoint --multus-conf-file=auto --multus-autoconfig-dir=/host/etc/cni/net.d --cni-conf-dir=/host/etc/cni/net.d. The image's default user is the unprivileged multuscni (uid 999); both containers set runAsUser: 0, because they write the host's root-owned /etc/cni/net.d and /opt/cni/bin, and only the init container install-multus-binary also sets privileged: true (upstream also sets it on kube-multus; the bundle drops it there, since root's default capabilities are enough).

docker run --rm --entrypoint /usr/src/multus-cni/bin/multus readystack/multuscni:v4.3.1-CE-ubuntu24.04-r1 -version

Prints multus: version:v4.3.1(dirty,released), commit:d61706810cc8be60381dcb66e6a2428d5eb2795a, date:2026-09-04T15:50:51+00:00. Multus itself runs as the DaemonSet. dirty is upstream's own build script reporting a changed tree: this build raises three dependencies (golang.org/x/net, golang.org/x/text, google.golang.org/grpc) to their fixed versions; the Multus source itself is the v4.3.1 tag.

⁠The full ReadyStack Hermetic Build Kit

The complete --network=none build kit for this image — plus admin/DB/API handbooks, the build's validation records, and its build provenance records — is a free download for any registered account at readystack.dev/products/multuscni⁠. A clean-room rebuild from this release's archive on an egress-blocked host reproduced its linux/amd64 digest sha256:f90014221243e98cf21d56dc66e3f53bf386c1c1484a633e550dadf4e39f324e on 2026-10-29.

— ReadyStack · readystack.dev

Tag summary

Content type

Image

Digest

sha256:78f44ceb9…

Size

670.5 kB

Last updated

4 days ago

docker pull readystack/multuscni:sha256-f90014221243e98cf21d56dc66e3f53bf386c1c1484a633e550dadf4e39f324e.att